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                                                                    ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the applicable regulatory/compliance regime concerning RCs’ determination of 
executive pay and its disclosure.  It hypothesises that although the results of UK regulation have been 
very beneficial overall (i.e., the benefits do indeed justify the obligations imposed), particular UK 
corporate governance failures regarding executive pay have arisen due to the combination of the 
applicable regulatory regime with other factors.   It finds that in respect of accountability and 
transparency very considerable progress has been made;  however, regarding the pay-performance 
linkage in particular much remains to be done concerning ‘rewards for failure’, the need for a longer-
term time horizon and LTI design generally. 
 
Although this paper concludes that its hypothesis is correct, six recommendations are made for 
future improvement regarding (i) regulation, (ii) institutional shareholders, (iii) remuneration 
committees, (iv) remuneration committee advisors/in-house executive compensation HR specialists, 
(v) remuneration package design, and (vi) corporate ethics/behaviour. The goal of improvement is 
well worth striving for because corporate governance failure on executive pay harms the concept of 
responsible capitalism and the success of companies on which UK jobs and taxes depend. 
 
 
Key words.   executive pay:  pay regulation:  pay disclosure:  ‘rewards for  
failure’:  remuneration committees:  remuneration consultants:  institutional shareholders:   
corporate ethics. 
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                                                                    CHAPTER 1 
 
1.       INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE 
 
Executive pay in the UK excites the interest of academics, politicians, regulators, the media, 
company investors/institutional shareholders, business leaders, the working population and the 
country at large. The rise in UK executive pay levels since the 1980s is widely condemned by most 
such groups – as being out of line with pay growth amongst the workforce generally and not being  
appropriately linked to performance (so-called ‘rewards for failure’). 
 
Although this paper covers two aspects of UK executive pay in particular – namely, the applicable 
regulatory/compliance regime regarding RCs’ determination of executive pay and its disclosure – in 
order to provide the appropriate setting for review and recommendations for future reform it 
necessarily includes certain other executive pay areas.  The context within which the various aspects 
are reviewed and considered is ‘agency theory’, and whether benefits arising from regulation justify 
the obligations imposed.  
 
In the UK the process by which RCs determine executive pay (and its subsequent disclosure) is highly  
regulated  via legislation, listing rules and self-regulation contained in institutional investor codes  
and guidelines.   However (with the exception of certain financial services – specific aspects), 
board/senior executive pay is not specifically regulated on matters such as basic salary levels, STIs  
and LTIs, together with the size/level of the remuneration package overall.   Having said this, the  
direction since 1980 has been for publicly-quoted companies to be subject to very considerable 
regulatory and other constraints on executive remuneration packages.   The charge was originally led 
by institutional shareholders, but detailed legislation has followed in its wake. 
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Accordingly, the UK regime is not one where RCs can simply pay what they want to EDs (and senior  
management) and without disclosure to and, indeed, the voting approval of shareholders in certain  
cases.   For example, LTIs using newly-issued share capital have always required shareholder  
approval and since 2002 there has been a shareholders’ annual advisory vote on the DRR.   Annual  
election for directors were introduced in 2010 and now a binding vote has been added for  
remuneration policy (the advisory vote is ‘backwards looking’, whereas the binding vote ‘looks  
forward’).   So the UK is a highly regulated environment, yet criticisms of executive pay  
grow apace. 
 
This paper’s hypothesises that although the results of regulation have been very beneficial overall  
(i.e., the benefits do indeed justify the obligations imposed – with the important caveat that certain  
recommended future improvements are set out), particular UK corporate governance failures 
regarding executive pay have arisen due to the combination of the applicable regulatory regime with  
other factors.   Brian Main’s 2007 publications show the challenges entailed in RCs original 
responsibility for policing the probity of the pay determination process now being supplemented by 
their far more demanding role as key players in the strategic human resource management of 
companies, together with the influence of institutional shareholders channelling RCs down 
‘tramlines’ of remuneration package design (which can replicate unwelcome aspects of fund 
managers’ own incentive arrangements).1, 2 Top FTSE boardroom/executive pay has massively 
increased (but so has the size, complexity and globality of companies), whilst the motivational 
psychology of incentive pay has been insufficiently taken into account.  
                                                          
1
 Brian Main, Calvin Jackson, John Pymm and Vicky Wright ‘The Remuneration Committee and Strategic Human 
Resource Management’ (2007) Corporate Governance: An International Review 16 (3) 235-238   Accessed  12
th
 
June 2014. 
 
2
 Brian Main, Calvin Jackson, John Pymm and Vicky Wright ‘Questioning the Remuneration Committee Process’ 
(2007) Working Paper 
<http://homepages.ed.ac.uk/mainbg/Files/questioning%20the%20remuneration%20committee%20process%2
0-%20%2021%20feb%202007.pdf >   Accessed 12
th
 June 2014. 
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RCs have struggled in effectively discharging the duties they are now charged to perform.   The way 
in which RCs operate, the tasks they need to carry out and the stakeholders they perforce must 
satisfy, have all combined to make RCs’ role far more demanding and, some would argue, almost 
impossible to perform in a way that successfully reduces criticisms of executive pay. 
 
This paper concludes its hypothesis is correct.   UK pay regulation over the past 35 years has been 
greatly beneficial and justifies the obligations imposed.   On accountability and transparency ‘UK 
PLC’ has seen very considerable corporate governance improvements;  however, in respect of 
performance-linkage in particular much remains to be done regarding ‘rewards for failure’, the need 
for a longer-term time horizon and LTI design generally.    
 
Set out in this paper are six recommendations for future improvement concerning (i) regulation, 
(ii) institutional shareholders, (iii) remuneration committees, (iv) remuneration committee  
advisors/in-house executive compensation HR specialists, (v) remuneration package design, and  
(vi) corporate ethics/behaviour.    It seeks to be the first step in a process requiring further work to 
be undertaken. The goal is well worth striving for because corporate governance failure on executive 
pay aspects harms the concept of responsible capitalism and the success of companies on which UK 
jobs and taxes depend. 
 
Chapter 2 of this paper reviews the UK regulatory framework for executive pay regulation – it covers  
both RCs’ determination of executive pay and the subsequent disclosure of pay/remuneration 
policies and packages.   Chapter 3 deals with the comparative perspective, looking at the position  
respectively in the USA, EU, Germany, France and Japan.   The paper then continues with Chapter 4’s 
findings and discussion arising out the material in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively.   Finally, Chapter 5 
contains conclusions and six recommendations based on the foregoing review and analysis.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2.       UK REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
2.1     Agency issues 
Brian Main states:  ‘the problems of creating incentives for the top managers of an enterprise where  
ownership is widely dispersed (…) gained the label of separation of “ownership from control”.’3 He 
cites Adam Smith4 in respect of the former proposition and Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means 
regarding the latter5, and states that:  ‘the dominant theoretical approach to the modern version of 
this problem is agency theory, which points to the use of an appropriately designed reward 
mechanism as a way of aligning the interests of the directors with those of the owners’6 – the first 
aspect being attributed to Michael Jensen and William Meckling7 and the second to Kevin Murphy.8   
Main cites9 Jensen and Murphy: ‘agency theory predicts an optimal contract will tie the agent’s 
expected utility to the principal’s worth;  therefore agency theory predicts that CEO compensation 
policies will depend on changes in shareholder wealth’.10 
 
                                                          
3
 Main, note 1, 3. 
 
4
 Adam Smith An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (The University of Chicago, 
1976), 264.  
 
5
 Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Macmillan Co, 1932), 25. 
 
6
 Main, note 3. 
 
7
 Michael Jensen and William Meckling ‘Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure’ (1976) Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (4) 305 – 360. 
 
8
 Kevin Murphy ‘Executive Compensation’ in Otley Ashenfelter and David Card (eds.) Handbook of Labour 
Economics (McGraw–Hill, 1999). 
  
9
 Main, note 3. 
 
10
 Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy ‘Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives’ (1990) Journal of 
Political Economy, 98 (2) 225 – 264. 
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Ian Gregory–Smith states: ‘the extensive academic literature on the growth of executive 
compensation has tended to polarise around one of two positions:  the rents-capture view and the 
optimal contracting approach’11.   He cites Lucian Bebchuk12  and Jesse Fried 13 as propounding  the 
former position, stating: ‘CEOs can subvert the compensation-setting process through their ‘capture’ 
of the remuneration committee’, which can only be controlled by shareholders via ‘withholding 
consent to egregious proposals and/or by constraining these proposals in anticipation of a 
stockholder vote’.14  In contrast, Gregory-Smith states:  ‘the optimal contracting view suggests that 
CEO compensation is determined by the operation of the market for managerial talent’15.   He cites 
Xavier Gabaix in respect of the latter16 – noting that Gabaix’s research work carried out both before 
and since the  GFC comes to the same conclusion. 17    
 
There are here, therefore, two very different views of executive pay:  the rents-capture theory holds  
that shareholders can usefully employ their votes to control managers, whereas the optimal  
contracting view propounds that the market determines pay levels and shareholder involvement can  
be ‘at best meddlesome and at worst disruptive’.18 
                                                          
11
 Ian Gregory-Smith, Steve Thompson and Peter Wright ‘Say or Pay in the UK:  Modest effect, Even After the 
Crisis’ (VOX EU 24
th
 March 2014) <http://www.voxeu.org/article/controlling-uk-executive-pay>   Accessed  27
th
 
May 2014. 
 
12
 Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried ‘Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem’ (2003) Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 17 (3)  71 – 92. 
 
13
 Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried Pay without Performance:  The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive 
Compensation (Harvard University Press, 2004). 
 
14
 Gregory–Smith, note 11. 
 
15
 Gregory-Smith, note 11. 
 
16
 Xavier Gabaix and Augustin Landier ‘Why has CEO Pay Increased so Much?’ (2006) National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Papers <http://www.nber.org/papers/w12365>   Accessed 17
th
 June 2014. 
 
17
 Xavier Gabaix, Augustin Landier and Julien Sauvagnat ‘CEO Pay and Firm Size: An Update After the Crisis’ 
(February 2014)  The Economic Journal, 124 (574), F40–F59. 
  
18
 Gregory-Smith, note 11. 
 
Candidate Number:   140993 
 
[6] 
 
Gregory-Smith’s finding is that the UK’s original say-on-pay legislation (i.e., an annual advisory vote 
of shareholders – on the DRR for the previous financial year) had ‘a relatively modest effect on  
executive pay.’ Until this year’s AGM Season, US and UK companies were on the same playing field in 
that under both regimes there was an annual backwards looking advisory vote.   However, the UK 
has now moved to a binding vote on remuneration policy (looking forward three years, in normal 
circumstances), plus continuing with a non-binding vote looking back on how remuneration policy 
has actually been implemented.   Presumably, rents-capture proponents would view the new UK 
position as being a significant improvement - with ‘optimal contracts’ devotees  maintaining it will 
make matters worse.    
 
2.2            UK executive pay regulation:  1979 -2013 
In 1979 a Conservative government came into power, heralding ‘Thatcher’s Britain’. The subsequent 
35 years can be split into three periods: 1979  –  1992, 1992  –  2003 and 2003  –  2014.   The first, 
1979 – 1992, was a sort of ‘pre-lapsarian world’ before the Cadbury Report’s (1992) Code of Best 
Practice ‘comply or explain’ regime.19   The middle period, 1992 – 2003, saw the Greenbury (1995)20 
and Hampel (1998)21 Reports on directors’ pay and corporate governance, respectively – with listed 
company directors’ pay disclosure requirements introduced in 1995 and the introduction in 2002 of 
the annual advisory vote on the DRR, then the Higgs Report (2003) on NEDs.22   The final period, 
                                                          
19
 The Cadbury Report ‘Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance’ (Gee 
Publishing, 1992). 
 
20
 The Greenbury Report  ‘Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury’ (Gee Publishing, 1995). 
 
21
 The Hampel Report ‘Committee on Corporate Governance’ (Gee Publishing, 1998). 
 
22
 The Higgs Review  ‘Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-executive Directors’ (2003) 
(www.dti.gov.uk/cld/non_exec_review). 
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2003 – 2014, covers the GFC, the Walker Review23 (2009), the FSA Remuneration Code 24 (first issued 
in 2009) and the binding vote on remuneration policy introduced for this year’s AGM Season. 
 
The 35-year period has seen the process by which executive pay is determined by RCs, and its  
disclosure, move from very modest disclosure stipulated in the Companies Acts, formal RC  
structures being in place in only a minority of companies, plus self-regulation via institutional  
shareholder guidelines and listing rule requirements, to the current position where disclosure of  
pay now takes the form of a ‘single overall figure’ for directors’ remuneration, RCs being universally  
in place, plus corporate governance codes and listing rules.  There are additionally EU remuneration 
rules (particularly those applicable to the financial services sector), together with the full panoply of 
institutional shareholder guidelines (e.g., the ABI25, NAPF26, PIRC27 and IVIS/RREV28 - the Investment 
Affairs Division of the ABI, covering remuneration guidelines, has recently been transferred to the 
Investment Management Association, but for the purposes of this paper all references to the ABI’s 
remuneration guidelines will continue to be referred to as ABI).  
  
                                                          
23
 The Walker Review ‘A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities’ 
(2009) <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/walker_review_information.htm>. 
 
24
 The FSA Remuneration Code (2009) www.fca.org.uk. 
 
25
 ABI ‘Principles of Executive Remuneration’(2013) <https://www.ivis.co.uk/guidelines>   Accessed 19
th
 June 
2014.  
 
26
 NAPF ‘Corporate Policy and Voting Guidelines’ (2013) 
<https://www.napf.co.uk/PolicyandResearch/DocumentLibrary/0352_%20NAPF_corp_gov>   Accessed 19
th
 
June 2014. 
 
27
 PIRC ‘UK Shareholder Voting Guidelines’ (2013) <https://www.pirc.co.uk.>   Accessed 19
th
 June 2014. 
 
28
 RREV ‘UK Remuneration Committee Guidance’ (2013)  
<https://www.issgovernance.com/files/ISSRREV2013UKRemunerationGuidance.pdf.>   Accessed 19
th
 June 
2014 and NAPF ‘Corporate Governance Policies and Voting Guidelines’ (2013) 
<https://www.napf.co.uk/PolicyandResearch/DocumentLibrary/-
/Media/Policy/Documents/0277corporategovernancepolicyandvotingguidelinesonNAPFdocument.ashx>   
Accessed 19
th
 June 2014. 
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As stated by Main in 2007: ‘[W]hile it is true to say that top executive pay remains unregulated in the 
UK, the same cannot be said for the process by which it is determined.  The practices and procedures 
of the now near universal remuneration committees are carefully prescribed in self-regulating codes 
and institutional guidelines’. 29   This was finessed by Peter King: ‘In the UK, there is no statutory limit 
on, or prescribed structure for, remuneration for executive directors (save that certain financial 
institutions are subject to the CRD and FSA Remuneration Code)’.30   
 
Instead, companies are required to adhere to the UKCGC/UKSC ‘comply or explain’ regime.   There 
are also legislative requirements on disclosure; for example, section 420 (1) of the Companies Act 
2006 and the report disclosure requirements set out in section 422A of the Companies Act 2006 and 
The Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2013 SI 2013/1981. 
 
The influence of institutional shareholders on UK executive pay package structure and  
determination remains very strong.   Main stated in 2007: ‘what truly distinguishes UK  
arrangements from those in the USA is the way that British institutional investors have been  
prepared to set about influencing the conduct (as opposed to the structure) of the committee’. 31    
They continue to be prepared to ‘red top’ and vote against LTIs that do not conform to their 
guidelines regarding quantum, share dilution and performance measures.   This has been ongoing 
for the past 35 years, reinforced by the introduction of the UKSC in 2011. 32 
 
                                                          
29
 Main, note 2,2. 
 
30
 Peter King, Holly Gregory, Lauren Pau and Rebecca Grapsas ‘Disclosure of Executive Remuneration in the UK:  
Recent Developments and US Comparison’ (2012) < www.practicallaw.com/corpgov-mjg>    Accessed 12
th
 June 
2014. 
 
31
 Main, note 2, 5. 
 
32
 UKSC <https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-Stewardship>    
Accessed 5
th
 June 2014. 
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 This paper addresses the executive pay/corporate governance of companies with a premium  
listing (most other quoted companies do in fact adhere to a greater or lesser extent with the 
relevant regime).   ‘Executive pay’ refers to the individual pay components (e.g., basic salary, STI 
(annual bonus paid, LTI and pensions) and remuneration packages overall of EDs together with their 
direct reports (usually comprising the ‘Operating Board’ of publicly-quoted companies – for example, 
CEO, CFO, Business Heads, HR Director and General Counsel/Group Secretary).   The Chairman and 
NEDs are also included, albeit that UK practice is broadly to pay such directors by way of a straight 
fee (as opposed to participation in STIs and LTIs or pension arrangements). 
 
This paper focuses on London premium listed companies generally (i.e., it covers the full spectrum of 
industry sectors), but there is recognition of the fact that certain financial services ones are also 
covered by particular EU legislation (e.g., CRD IV and UCITS V) and/or the FCA Remuneration Code. 
 
Any comparative international perspective of executive pay needs to take account of the  
differences between unitary board structures (e.g., USA and UK) and dual ones (e.g., Germany, 
Switzerland and Netherlands).  It must also be noted that, although two territories may operate say-
on-pay advisory votes (e.g., USA and UK) what is actually put to shareholders for their vote will differ 
significantly (e.g., the directors/senior executives in the population covered differs between the UK – 
EDs and NEDs  – and USA – CEO, CFO and three most highly paid executive officers, plus outside 
directors).   More detailed disclosure requirements can also apply to certain financial services 
companies (e.g., the ‘banded’ pay disclosures for ‘high end’ staff).   The context is that despite the 
UK executive pay regulatory regime (including the UKCGC33/UKSC and financial services special 
provisions), there remains strong criticism.   
                                                          
33
 UKCGC (2012) <www.frc.org.UK/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-Corporate-
Governance-Code.aspx>   Accessed 5
th
 June 2014.   (Note: although the UKCGC does not have legal force, 
breach of ‘comply or explain’ could well amount to an infringement of the Listing Rules, with various sanctions 
attached <https://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/LR/918>   Accessed 5
th
 June 2014). 
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2.2.1.           Review:   1979 – 1992 
ED remuneration packages in 1979 were characterised by long notice periods (three years’ salary 
plus benefits was the norm, compared now to one year’s basic salary and benefits), modest STI and 
LTI opportunity, but ‘gold-plated’ DB pension arrangements (delivering two-thirds of final salary, 
after 20 years’ service).   The remuneration package focused on executive security, with relatively 
little variable pay linked to performance.   This is hardly surprising, tax rates were high so it made 
sense to major on tax-approved pension arrangements.   Today, the variable pay components of the 
package make up the majority of its value and DB pension provision for new recruits is rare. 
 
In the mid-nineteen eighties, institutional shareholders addressed the dramatic growth in LTI 
provision following the 1984 enactment of tax-favoured Inland Revenue approved share option 
schemes.  Such arrangements are put to shareholders for approval – with strict limits on potential 
dilution, and guidelines on the size of LTI awards expressed as a multiple of salary (valued at the date 
of grant).   The relevant guidelines were initially simple (for example, performance conditions 
governing the exercise of share options were not introduced until 1986). 
 
RCs were still a nascent feature in UK companies and the disclosure of remuneration packages was 
skeletal (ie by anonymous ‘bands’, rather than on an individual director basis).  There was a level of 
informality and lack of structure around the determination and disclosure of board/executive pay 
that seems extraordinary today.   However, this was not to last. The Conservative government’s 
privatisation of utilities, coupled with strong stock market performance in the late 1980s/early 
1990s, led to a furore over ‘windfall gains’ arising from tax-favoured executive share options.   
Worse than this though was the increasing lack of investor confidence in the honesty and 
accountability of listed companies, due to the sudden failure of Coloroll and Polly Peck.  This led to 
the establishment of the Cadbury Committee (which then had to contend with BCCI and Maxwell).    
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2.2.2.          Review:   1992 – 2003 
Cadbury’s Code of Best Practice, which introduced the ‘comply or explain’ regime, set the scene for 
board accountability to shareholders on pay matters – with recommendations on EDs’ contracts not 
exceeding three years, disclosure of directors’ total emoluments (including pensions and LTIs) and 
pay being determined by RCs ‘made up wholly or mainly of non-executive directors.’34    This is 
modern executive pay in recognisable form – incorporated originally (1992) into the Combined Code 
and now its successor the UKCGC.    
 
Companies established RCs and appointed remuneration consultants to provide pay data and advise 
on the design and introduction of STIs and LTIs. In 2009 remuneration consultants worked with 
Walker to produce the VC.35   Much has been written about the supposedly malign, Svengali-like 
influence of remuneration consultants – with alleged ‘ratcheting up’ of pay levels caused by 
inappropriate pay benchmarking and promoting incentive schemes designed to ‘reward for failure’.    
Warren Buffett in particular has criticised remuneration consultants in the US.36   
 
As pointed out in the VC though: ‘(…) it is important to clarify the role that executive remuneration 
consultants fulfil.   Their role is to provide advice and information which they believe to be 
appropriate and in the best interests of the company (…) the role of consultants is not to make 
decisions’.37   In other words, remuneration consultants provide information and advice to RCs (and 
                                                          
34
 The Cadbury Report, note 19, Code of Best Practice, paragraph 3.3. 
 
35
 Remuneration Consultants Group ‘Voluntary Code of Conduct in Relation to Executive Remuneration 
Consulting in the United Kingdom’ (2014)  
<https://www.remunerationconsultantsgroup/assets/Docs/RCG%20Code%20of%20Conduct>   Accessed  20
th
 
June 2014. 
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Based on 26
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th
 June 2014. 
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in doing so have duties of transparency, integrity, objectivity, competence, due care and 
confidentiality), but the RC itself is responsible for determining executive pay for EDs. 
 
Another focus in Cadbury was on institutional shareholders: ‘given the weight of their votes, the  
way in which institutional shareholders use their power to influence the standards of corporate 
governance is of fundamental importance’.38 The latest UKCGC reinforces this.39 Institutional 
shareholder guidelines still exercise a strong influence, but the incentive arrangements operated by 
institutional shareholders for their own management and key staff may reflect rewards for exactly 
the same ‘short-termism’ for which they criticise their investee companies (see Lord  Myners’s 
observations regarding the way incentives drive the actions of fund managers:  ‘It is clear that the 
government must be involved, at the very least encouraging a cultural shift away from short-term to 
long-term based performance pay’).40 
 
The Greenbury Report (1995) focused solely on directors’ remuneration.  The Code of Best Practice 
addressed compliance on a ‘comply or explain’ basis, with specific pay disclosure and policy 
requirements.   The Cadbury disclosure recommendations were actually implemented:  ‘the report 
should contain full details of all elements in the remuneration package of each individual director by 
name’.41     Additionally, ‘[R]emuneration committees should consist exclusively of non-executive 
directors’.42 
                                                          
38
 The Cadbury Report, note 19, paragraph 6.10. 
 
39
 UKCGC, note 33, 5 (Note: FRC Consultation Paper on Executive Pay, 13
th
 October 2013 and Consultation 
Paper on UKCGC, 24
th
 April 2014). 
 
40
 House of Commons Business, Innovation and Skills Committee ‘The Kay Review of UK  
Equity Markets and Long–term Decision Making: Government Response to the Committee's Third Report of 
Session 2013–14’ (2013) HC 762 paragraph 62, 28 
<https://www.publications.Parliament.UK/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmbis/603/603.pdf>  Accessed 12
th
 June 
2014. 
 
41
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Although the RC would produce an annual report for shareholders, this would not be put to vote. It 
was not until 2002 that there was an annual advisory vote on the DRR.  Greenbury favoured the 
replacement of option schemes by performance shares - with three-year comparative TSR governing 
the vesting of awards, as opposed to vesting being reliant just on continued service and absolute 
business performance (e.g., EPS growth over inflation, with a stipulated performance hurdle/range). 
 
The Hampel Report (1998) stated :  ‘the emphasis on accountability has tended to obscure a board’s 
first responsibility – to enhance the prosperity of the business over time’43.   Hampel focused on 
practical issues (e.g. abhorring ‘box ticking’):  ‘(…) it is dangerous to encourage the belief that rules 
and regulations about structure will deliver success.   Accountability by contrast does require 
appropriate rules and regulations, in which disclosure is the most important element’.44  It 
recommended a strengthening of the Cadbury ‘comply or explain’ regime.  
 
The Labour Government introduced an annual advisory vote on the DRR (2002), the dotcom stock 
market crash in 2001 having focused minds again on ‘rewards for failure’ and the belief that boards 
needed to be made more accountable.   The UK ‘say-on-pay’ legislation required the RC to include 
details in the DRR of remuneration policy for the current and previous financial years (and figures of 
each director’s pay), introduced via The Directors’ Report Remuneration Regulations 2002 SI 
2002/1986.   
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As indicated by Gregory-Smith, the UK effect of say-on-pay was modest - even after the GFC. 45 
Sudhakar Balachandran’s research of UK companies following the introduction of the advisory vote 
found: ‘these tests confirm the increase in sensitivity of CEO cash and (more weakly) total  
compensation to negative operating performance after the new rule, but not the increase in  
sensitivity of CEO total compensation to negative stock performance’.46   
 
The period 1992 – 2003 closes with the 2003 Higgs Report on the effectiveness of NEDs.   Higgs 
refers to ‘a background of corporate turbulence’.47   NEDs were centre stage – with 
recommendations on their role and duties, remuneration, time commitment, training, plus a 
summary of the RC’s principal duties. He makes the point – echoed by Main subsequently – that 
‘expectations of non-executive directors have risen as increased business complexity has made it 
more difficult for shareholders effectively to hold management to account’.48   However, Main 
additionally stresses that it is the work RCs now need to do over and above ensuring business 
probity that may reveal the potential shortcomings of NEDs’ performance. 
 
2.2.3.       Review:   2003 – 2014 
Following the introduction of the DRR/say-on-pay regulation (2002), and the Higgs Review (2003), 
there was the introduction of the relevant Companies Act 2006 provisions (notably section 420 (1) 
stipulating disclosure provisions for quoted companies - prescribed in The Large and Medium-sized 
companies and groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008 S1 2008/410). 
                                                          
45
 Gregory-Smith, note 11. 
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 Sudhakar Balachandran, Fabrizio Ferri and David Maber ‘Solving the Executive Compensation Problem 
Through Shareholder Votes? Evidence from the UK’ (2007) Harvard Business School Working Paper  
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Martin Conyon’s research investigated UK voting in the period 2002 – 2007, to assess the effect of 
the mandatory non-binding vote.49   It found a vote against/abstention rate of less than 10% against 
the DRR – notwithstanding that shareholders were more likely to vote against DRR resolutions than 
non-pay ones (particularly voting against LTIs and STIs).   The overall conclusion was ‘limited 
evidence that on average say-on-pay materially alters  the subsequent level and design of CEO 
compensation.’50 This is hardly surprising given that the research of Keith Hallock (and others) has 
shown that ‘one of the variables most highly correlated with executive compensation is the size of 
the company’.51  This holds for assets/number of employees and market value.52   
 
Main makes the point however that the expectations on RCs have risen: ‘from simply being a 
guarantor of the probity of the pay process to one of performing a key principal-agent role in the 
strategic human resource management of the company’.53  He adds: ‘it can clearly be seen that step-
by-step the remuneration committee has been increasingly asked to take responsibility for ensuring 
that the executive reward structure is aligned with the overall business strategy of the company’.54    
 
With the introduction of the advisory vote RCs came under annual pressure ‘to keep in view both 
the previously-awarded incentive schemes and the current design of incentive schemes’.55 
                                                          
49
  Martin Conyon and Graham Sadler ‘Shareholder Voting and Directors’ Remuneration Report Legislation:  
Say on Pay in the United Kingdom’ (2010) Corporate Governance: An International Review 18 (4) 262-312.   
 
50
 Conyon, note 49, 262. 
 
51
 Kevin Hallock ‘The Relationship Between Company Size and CEO Pay’ (2011) Workspan  
<http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/ICS/InsightsAndConvenings/upload/02-11-Research-for-the-real-world.pdf>  
Accessed 19
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 Xavier Gabaix, Augustin Landier and Julien Sauvagnat, note 17. 
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 Main, note 2,2. 
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In other words, RCs have become part of the strategic human resource management process within  
companies.   Part of avoiding ‘rewards for failure’ is RCs structuring and ‘calibrating’ pay to the long-
term performance and sustainability of the business.    
 
Main’s concerns over RC performance (‘remuneration committees feel constrained in their choice by  
an institutional isomorphism of remuneration design, particularly with regard to LTIs; they  
commonly fail to allocate the time or resource to calibrate or confirm the effective operation of the  
chosen remuneration plan and many of their actions are dominated by a perceived need to be able  
to justify any high pay outcomes in communications with shareholders and institutional investors’56), 
focus on whether the way in which RCs go about their role ‘limits the extent to which they are able 
to live up to the high expectations placed upon them in terms of effecting an alignment of executive  
interests with the critical success factors of corporate strategy’.57 
As if all this was not challenging enough, along came the GFC.   James Barty58 details four examples 
of ‘rewards for failure’ prior to the onset, during or after the GFC; namely, Royal Bank of Scotland 
Group,59 Thomas Cook,60 Punch Taverns61 and Cable & Wireless.62     
The Walker Review (2009) made detailed recommendations on the governance of risk, plus the 
design of remuneration arrangements. It makes the point (amply echoed in the subsequent Salz 
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Review of Barclays63) that:  ‘board conformity with laid down procedures will not alone provide 
better corporate governance (…) the behaviour changes that may be needed are unlikely to be 
fortified by regulatory fiat, which in any event risks provoking unintended consequences’.   Walker 
referred to the need for ‘behaviour improvement’.64 
 
 
Walker considered the UK unitary board structure and the UKCGC remain fit for purpose, but with 
the addition of FSA (FCA) bank/financial sector-specific measures (for example, the FCA  
Remuneration Code and the SYSC High Level Standards part of the FCA Handbook).65   There have 
also been EU initiatives regarding banking pay (e.g. CRD IV), imposing limits on STIs (expressed in 
terms of multiples of basic salary – one times basic salary unless shareholder approval is obtained,  
whereupon the limit is two times basic salary),  the effect of which has been to instigate the  
substitution of part of STI opportunity with ‘annual allowances’ (which do not reflect current 
performance). Significant basic salary rises (as compensation for lower STI opportunity) have also 
increased the ‘overhead’ available for STIs.   The bizarre outcome of basic salary increases and the 
payment of ‘annual allowances’ has been that banks’ fixed compensation costs have increased 
dramatically. 
 
 
The new UK legislation66 has been criticised by Damien Knight - on grounds including that the ‘single 
pay figure’ disclosed should be expressed both as ‘remuneration awarded’ and ‘remuneration 
                                                          
63
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realised’, as opposed to just the latter. 67   Knight’s view is that whereas the latter is a better 
measure for assessing whether company performance justifies total remuneration, the former is 
better for assessing changes in policy.   Barty considers the UK legislation’s approach of triggering a 
binding vote on policy the following year if a company loses its annual advisory one is ‘overly 
convoluted’, preferring instead the Australian ‘two strikes’ basis. He also considers that including 
LTIs in ‘the single figure’ confuses the differing time periods over which these are earned.68  In any 
event, the UK’s new legislation of a binding ‘policy’ vote (supplementing an advisory 
‘implementation’ one) is likely to be adopted by the EU in an update of the SRD.69  
 
2.3.        REMUNERATION COMMITTEES’ DETERMINATION OF EXECUTIVE PAY 
Cadbury recommended:  ‘boards should  appoint non-executive directors and chaired by a non-
executive director, to recommend to the board the remuneration of the executive directors in all its 
forms, drawing on outside advice if necessary’.70    
 
Greenbury proposed RCs should consist exclusively of NEDs71 and RCs should make a report each 
year to the shareholders on behalf of the board.   Pay levels should be no higher than necessary to 
‘attract motivate and retain’ the managerial talent required.72  Hampel rightly stated:   ‘Greenbury 
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was not about controlling board remuneration, nor can that ever be done in a free market economy.  
But it is already clear that Greenbury’s primary aim – full disclosure – is being achieved.’73 
 
Hampel found ‘general acceptance that non-executive directors should have both a strategic and  
monitoring function’.74   In Main’s eyes though, RC members have strategic, monitoring and 
functional roles – the latter being their integral role in the company’s strategic human resource 
management (i.e., being key players in the design and management of all elements of the executive 
remuneration package).   It is this aspect of the RCs’ role that causes concern to Main (and similar 
themes can be picked up in Higgs).  
 
2.4.           EXECUTIVE PAY DISCLOSURE REGIME 
Disclosure is only part of the story,  just as important is what actually goes into the relevant tables. 
For example, LTIs can be valued at grant/award or vesting/exercise date – and methods vary from a 
simple calculation of by how much shares are ‘in the money’ to sophisticated variants of the Black-
Scholes valuation methodology (using binomial lattice and Montecarlo techniques).   Greenbury 
disclosure of remuneration was fairly straightforward though; for basic salary and STI it was the 
amounts paid in, or in respect of, the relevant financial period, whereas the grant and 
exercise/vesting of LTIs was simply tabled and pensions were disclosed on a narrative basis. 
 
In the early 2000s, accounting for share incentives was introduced (IFRS 1992).   This meant  
that a ‘cost’ figure for LTIs was reflected in the profit and loss account.   Such valuations used Black- 
Scholes type methodology, and at the same time many RCs started using present economic value  
techniques for pay benchmarking and determining LTI award/grant levels.    
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Knight’s criticisms mentioned earlier are relevant.75   To make proper comparisons over time the 
disclosure of both LTIs ‘awarded’ and ‘realised’ is needed (plus a share price growth table in the 
policy scenario charts). 76 RCs often determine grant/award levels in light of the relative ‘severity’ of 
the performance conditions attached to vesting/exercisability – so the legislation, in explicitly 
ignoring the upfront impact of performance conditions, rather turns the clock back on about 15 
years of sophisticated work that enabled RCs to assess LTI grant/award levels. 
 
In regards to pensions, the new legislation applies a multiple of 20 to value annual DB accruals – the 
same one as used for LTA purposes.   Again, this is a simplification that undervalues the cost/benefit 
of DB pension arrangements compared to DC ones (a corresponding annuity multiple, depending on 
assumptions selected, might perhaps be 30). 
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CHAPTER 3 
3.            COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
3.1.         Key features of the comparative exercise 
The approach adopted in this paper regarding selection of particular aspects of executive pay for 
comparison purposes is that used by Calvin Jackson in WW’s 2009 Study77 and the subsequent 
articles in Benefits & Compensation International magazine78; namely, the governance of executive 
pay – RCs/say-on-pay/disclosure of executive pay/STI and LTI design.  The present paper covers USA, 
EU, Germany, France and Japan. These territories (the EU being regarded as a single territory due to 
EU-specific legislation covering member states) comprise the World Bank’s ranking of the largest 
territories by GDP size (excluding China).79   
All the territories have RCs in operation and, to a greater or lesser extent, have say-on-pay regimes 
with NEDs comprising a majority (or at least a minority in Japan). ‘Comply or explain’ is strong in all 
but the USA and Japan. Accordingly, the comparative exercise shows sophisticated executive pay 
regulation in the territories concerned (save for Japan where the position is still rather nascent). 
 
3.2.            USA 
Bailey Morris-Eck points out:  ‘[T]he US did not take the UK path of non-binding ‘comply or explain’ 
codes, nor is it likely to given its vastly more complex regulatory structure and a host of diverse 
players who have different cultures and agendas’. 80   Yet she asserts Cadbury had a big impact on 
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subsequent initiatives by US exchanges ‘to put corporate governance on the map for listed 
companies’.81   She argues that this has resulted in shareholders being better organised and more 
focused on ‘achieving constructive dialogue with companies that will minimize excess and result in 
enhanced long-term shareholder value’.82   One can see, in the US, a beneficial flow from 
Enron/WorldCom days, through the SOX provisions (particularly, CEO and CFO ‘certification’ of 
accounts) to say-on-pay being introduced.  Indeed, as Morris-Eck states:  ‘it would be a mistake to 
regard the US as a vast corporate governance wasteland over the past twenty years of real if uneven 
process’. She views DFA’s say-on-pay as being a ‘game-changer’.   
 
The US was the first country to operate prevalently Compensation Committees (the US title for RCs).    
As reported by TW:  ‘the vast majority of companies continue to receive good marks from 
shareholders regarding their pay programs’.83  Ira Kay states: ‘though opportunities remain for 
companies to improve their pay programs, most should view SoP results as a general endorsement 
of the current executive pay model’.84   
 
Interestingly, the introduction of the US say-on-pay provisions is leading to more homogeneity of 
remuneration package design.   This follows the UK experience.  There is less scope for 
customization and innovation to fit a particular company’s circumstances.   Again, the US has 
followed the UK trend away from share options to performance shares and, ironically, the US is 
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focusing more on comparative TSR as a performance measure governing vesting at just the time that 
UK institutional shareholders are finally allowing more flexibility in performance measure selection. 
 
In summary, the US has RCs, pay disclosure and advisory say-on-pay, but does not operate ‘comply 
or explain’.   Todd Lippincott warns:  ‘[T]o support performance and longer-term success the next 
phase of executive compensation’s evolution needs to embrace these concepts of thoughtful 
customization and differentiation’. 85 It would be ironic if the US (just at the time when Lippincott 
states ‘we know that executive compensation design has not only changed, but has fundamentally 
improved’) opts for standardization in line with institutional shareholder guidelines and adopts 
performance measures which have been considerably discredited in the UK. 
 
3.3.         EU 
Mario Becht points out that, with the notable exception of the US, the ‘Cadbury Code has been 
copied, transposed or adopted in every member state of the European Union and in more than 60 
other countries elsewhere in the world’. 86 He rehearses the perceived advantages of ‘comply or 
explain’ as ‘a pragmatic tool that can improve corporate governance without the need for inflexible, 
burdensome and misguided rules, laws or regulation’.87 The ‘independent director’ concept has been 
adopted around the world (and included in the 1999 and 2004 versions of the OECD Corporate 
Governance Principles).   
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RiskMetrics refers to Cadbury as being the cornerstone of the ‘comply or explain’ framework in 
Europe, long before this system was introduced into European law. 88  However, the majority of the 
Western European states introducing codes of practice in the 1990s did not adopt ‘comply or 
explain’.   The second phase followed later (in the 2000s) and saw an internationalisation of the 
concept.  RiskMetrics warns ‘corporate governance codes in the EU must therefore be seen in their 
own specific contexts’.89   Becht emphasises EU market developments complicated matters further – 
so ‘to solve these cross-jurisdictional problems, the European Commission amended the Fourth 
Company Law Directive on annual accounts.  The Directive formally adopts the ‘comply or explain’ 
principle as ‘apply or depart and explain’ at the European level’.90   There must be a ‘corporate 
governance statement’ in the annual report (referring to the applicable code).  He maintains:  ‘[T]he 
European Union has solved the legal problem of codes incompatibility but in the process, it created a 
disclosure monster.’91    
 
The GFC provided impetus for EU initiatives on executive pay, mainly applicable to financial services.  
The remuneration aspects of CRD IV and UCITS V exemplify the level of detail with which the EU  
seeks to regulate executive pay in the sector. More generally than financial services, the 2011 Green 
Paper on the EU Corporate Governance  Framework,92 built on the EC’s 2009 Recommendation93 - 
with new guidelines on directors’ remuneration, currently remains ongoing.   This April the EC 
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published proposals on say-on-pay which largely mirror the recently-introduced UK rules. As pointed 
out by Tamsin Sridhara:  ‘the impact of the EC’s proposals will vary significantly from country to 
country in the EU because some, such as France, Germany and the UK have already introduced 
similar measures in whole or in part’.94 
 
3.4.        Germany 
Germany has both ‘comply or explain’ and say-on-pay (currently, the Vorst AG non-binding vote 
regime).   The combination of the German Corporate Governance Code and federal laws means that 
details of executive pay are published in annual reports and are subject to a shareholder advisory 
vote.  There are currently proposals to make the latter a binding vote, but these have stalled.   Each 
year the executive board and supervisory board publish a declaration of conformity with the Code 
(see for example, Softing AG’s 2013 declaration).95 
 
So German companies have RCs (the compensation committee of the supervisory board), ‘comply or  
explain’, plus say-on-pay.   The stalled proposals for a binding say-on-pay vote are likely to come in  
anyway, as and when the EU amendments to the SRD are enacted.   This would bring Germany into  
line with the current UK position on say-on-pay.    
 
3.5.   France 
Like Germany and the UK, France operates RCs, has ‘comply or explain’ provisions and an advisory  
say-on-pay regime for listed companies choosing to operate the key corporate governance code. 
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The AFEP and MEDEF (the two main French business groups) Corporate Governance Code has  
recently been revised (see Jones Day’s July 2013 newsletter96) and is applied extensively (as  
confirmed by the Financial Markets Authority).   Listed French companies must comply with the  
general French company law provisions and may also refer to recommendations in ‘a reference  
governance code’ – with any deviation from the code being disclosed to shareholders.   Jones Day 
refers to the AFEP and MEDEF Code as being the ‘code of choice’ for CAC 40 and other large French  
companies, with say-on-pay covering directors’ compensation packages. The shareholder vote is 
currently advisory, but in due course France – like Germany and other EU member states - will be 
covered by binding proposals contained in SRD amendments.   
 
3.6     Japan 
Japan operates RCs and discloses directors’ pay (albeit on an aggregate basis for all directors).   
Japan also has a binding shareholder vote to approve changes in director compensation amount  
and compensation policy.   But Sodali criticises Japan’s position:  ‘corporate governance standards  
for Japanese companies are underdeveloped and lag far behind global best practice (…) comply or  
explain in a code cannot work effectively in the absence of corporate governance principles against  
which non-compliance can be evaluated.’97   
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This is embarrassing in that, as pointed out by O’Melveney & Myers, Prime Minister Abe had ‘touted 
corporate governance reform as key to revitalizing the country’s economy’. 98  
 
It is not as if the Japanese themselves lack insight into these corporate governance challenges 
(particularly the continuing paucity of independent directors).   The Japanese Association of 
Corporate Directors’ guidelines detail some of the improvements made since the 2007 revision, but 
state that ‘a majority of investors are concerned about executive compensation systems of Japanese 
companies and pointed out the insufficiency of disclosure items regarding their executive 
compensation’.99
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CHAPTER 4 
 
4.            FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1.        Introduction to findings on UK regulatory regime applicable to executive pay 
BIS commented in 2011: ‘[T]he general disconnect between pay and long-term performance 
suggests that there is something dysfunctional about the market in executive pay or a failure in 
corporate governance arrangements’, noting: ‘[A]lthough concerns about executive pay are not new, 
the recent financial crisis has made shareholders, the public and Government more acutely aware of 
the issue and more critical of perverse incentives or excessive levels of reward’. 100    
 
Greenbury viewed accountability, transparency and performance as being the three key tenets.101  
On accountability, a RC of independent directors should determine EDs’ pay, and transparency 
effected by disclosing full information to shareholders in due course. There is now far more 
accountability and transparency in UK executive pay determination and disclosure. All UK listed 
companies have RCs comprised of independent NEDs, and the combination of advisory vote on 
implementation of remuneration policy and binding vote in respect of the policy itself gives 
shareholders greatly enhanced information and also the opportunity to vote on pay. 
 
There remains most controversy over pay levels and ‘rewards for failure’.   BIS states in respect of 
the former, that: ‘the median total remuneration of FTSE 100 CEOs has risen from an average of £1m 
to £4.2m for the period 1998 – 2000.   Growing company size, international competition for talent, 
benchmarking practices and the changing structure of pay are just some of the reasons cited for this 
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trend’.102   Regarding pay-for-performance, BIS states that:  ‘over the last decade the link between 
pay and performance has been hard to discern.    CEO pay has risen faster than the increase in the 
FTSE 100 index, retail prices or average remuneration levels across all employees for the same 
period’.103  
 
The responses to the BIS Consultation Paper were published in January 2012.104 Two-thirds of 
responses maintained that: ‘the link between pay and performance could be strengthened by 
moving away from TSR (because it is used on a comparative basis) and EPS (because it is perceived 
to be easy to manipulate) as measures of performance’.105  There was two-fifths support for 
extending LTI periods beyond the current three-year norm, whereas a similar proportion felt that the 
company should determine the period and just over one-third thought that vesting periods need not 
be as long as three years.106   
 
Over one-half of those who responded to the BIS Consultation agreed that simpler models of 
remuneration – such as ‘career shares’ (where directors hold shares in normal circumstances until 
they leave service and even beyond) – would align the interests of directors with shareholders. 107 
There was little support for a binding vote on remuneration policy and just ‘a small proportion 
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suggested that RCs should publish a single figure for each directors’ annual remuneration’ (which 
has now become law).108      
 
A not dissimilar situation occurred in 2011 in an EU context, where only a small minority agreed that 
the remuneration policy and remuneration report should be put to a binding vote by 
shareholders.109  Of course, the EU now proposes – following the UK – that both advisory and 
binding votes should be held. 110 
 
4.2.      Findings:   Remuneration committees’ determination of executive pay 
Main’s two 2007 papers111 , 112 can be summarised thus:  (i) RCs have moved ‘from simply being a 
guarantor of probity to playing a key principal-agent role in the strategic human resource 
management of the company’,113 (ii) the way RCs conduct their business is causing them difficulties 
in living up to these high expectations, and (iii) RC practice ‘cannot be understood from an agency 
theory perspective alone but benefits from recognition of the inertia, social embededness and path-
dependence encountered as remuneration committees seek legitimacy under the prevailing 
regulatory , normative and cognitive influences that condition their actions’.114 
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Main considers that ‘remuneration committees feel constrained in their choice by an institutional 
isomorphism of remuneration design, particularly with regard to LTIs’.115 Other concerns were 
whether RCs devoted sufficient time or resources to their duties (for LTI design, ‘calibration’ of LTIs 
and reviewing past operation) and ‘the perceived need to justify high pay outcomes to shareholders 
and institutional investors’.116   In relation to the latter, Main in his review of the literature refers, in 
relation to RCs’ behaviour, to:  ‘the driving motivation is not directly to maximise shareholder value 
but (…) to reach for a degree of ‘legitimacy’’.117    
 
This has important results, for example:  ‘performance criteria are chosen less because of their 
linkage with the key success factors of corporate strategy and more because of their common 
acceptance and use within the sector’.118   Main believes his work adds to that suggesting ‘that the 
dominant paradigm of agency theory may not be capable on its own of fully explaining the observed 
remuneration arrangements for a company’s top executives.   The arguments presented here 
suggests developing theory so as to set agency theory within a neo-institutional framework’.119 
 
Main questioned whether RCs were able to meet such high expectations.   In 2011 there was a 
further Main/TW Study of how RCs operate.120   The key findings were that (i) RC members had 
mixed views on the extent to which pay drives behaviour, (ii) technical knowledge of pay is not a 
prerequisite for sitting on a RC, and (iii) what has been earned from executive pay in prior years was 
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not seen as being of much relevance in decision-making.   There is a checklist of ‘key success factors 
for RCs’, with particular stress, as in 2007, on the crucial role of RC Chair.121 
 
Main’s findings are similar to Higgs’s regarding NEDs generally.   Sufficient time must be allocated for 
pre-reading reports, for the RC meeting itself and to hold regular meetings without any company 
management being present.   Main makes the point and RC: ‘membership was seen as requiring 
general skills rather than any particular skill in human resources.’122    
 
Main considers that, in respect of RCs’ strategic human resource management tasks, they are 
running ever faster simply to stand still.   For company management similar considerations apply.  As 
Barty states:  ‘[T]he comparison of share price performance with pay has often ignored the fact that 
global equity markets have struggled because of falling valuations rather than falling profits.   The 
FTSE 100 has seen valuations compress by around three-quarters since 1999, with the price earnings 
ratio falling from 40 to around 10 today’.123   Again, as pointed out by Barty:  ‘over the same period 
[1998 – 2010] FTSE 100 profits had risen by more than 250% and had further risen to over 300% by 
the end of 2011 (just about enough to offset the de-rating of the equity market)’.124   Barty considers 
that although ‘there has been some ratcheting up of executive pay, it is not as dramatically out of 
proportion as some have argued’.125 
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Barty’s findings are particularly important in that the UK debate over executive pay levels and pay 
for performance (and ‘rewards for failure’) focus very much on comparing executive pay against that 
of employees or selected equity indices.   He demolishes the former with a well-made ‘data timing 
dependency’ point in respect of the HPC’s ‘poorly informed analysis’126 and in respect of the latter 
he stresses that executive pay should be compared against profits, not equity indices.127   He also 
stresses the link between pay levels and company size.  
 
Barty states:  ‘if a CEO is successful they should be paid accordingly. The fatal flaw in the system is 
that executives do not suffer a loss if they fail – there remain rewards for failure’ and ‘this is a key 
issue of the principal agent problem.   If you are an owner/entrepreneur and the company you own 
fails you bear the loss.   Currently, if you are an executive and you fail the shareholders bear almost 
all the loss’. 128   This echoes the thrust of Gerald Garvey’s and Todd Milbourn’s views.129 Barty 
comments that: ‘while salaries have slightly doubled since 1998, bonuses have more than 
quadrupled and LTI payments are up tenfold’  (the figures for STI payments though have broadly 
tracked EPS growth).130 
 
The reason for stressing Barty’s findings is that, as pointed out by Main on LTIs, RCs feel constrained 
by the institutional shareholder guidelines’ focus on comparative TSR performance.  Having said this, 
more recent versions of the ABI guidelines refer to absolute operating performance measures being 
acceptable, provided these are ones shareholders would see as reflecting the long-term performance 
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of the company (this has led over time to ‘bifurcated’ or ‘trifurcated’ LTI metrics being adopted, part 
comparative TSR and part absolute business performance).131 
 
This paper’s finding regarding RCs’ determination of executive pay is that the regulation that started 
with Cadbury has been beneficial, but RCs’ task has grown ever harder.  Barty’s view is that this 
requires ‘increased professionalisation of the non-executive director role.’132    
 
4.3.      Findings:  Regime for disclosure of UK executive pay 
The term ‘disclosure’ is really a short cut for describing both the publication of directors’ pay 
packages (each director, by package component and overall) and also say-on-pay provisions.   The 
UK initially had simply the former (introduced post-Greenbury), the latter was introduced by the 
DRR advisory vote (in 2002). The binding vote on remuneration policy (plus the ‘single pay figure’) 
was recently added.   So we can see movement from the pre-Cadbury ‘banded emoluments’ figure, 
to now where the level of disclosure is extremely high.  It is too simplistic to argue however that 
because the level of directors’ pay has increased massively since disclosure that this is responsible 
for the increase (RCs have always had access to remuneration consultants’ pay survey data). 
    
This paper has already covered Knight’s and Barty’s criticisms of the most recent say-on-pay 
developments.   No doubt some disclosure compromises were necessary to produce a single figure 
enabling cross-company comparisons to be easily made, but it should have been possible to 
formulate more real life/accurate valuation methodologies.   
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Over the past 35 years the UK disclosure regime has improved dramatically for the better, but it 
remains work in progress.   Both in the UK and EU, the respective say-on-pay consultation exercises 
(2011) revealed a far from overwhelming demand for more legislation – but the UK has now moved 
to the combined advisory/binding vote process and it looks as if the EU will do the same.  This makes 
it all the more important that no opportunity is lost to make the actual disclosure format adopted as 
helpful as possible. 
 
4.4.             Findings:   Institutional shareholders 
Main’s points regarding institutional shareholders are important. 133   Apart from distinguishing the 
UK from the US (this is changing though in recent years, with the growing importance of ISS voting 
recommendations to US institutional shareholders regarding say-on-pay issues), it underlines that 
UK institutional shareholder guidelines have been an important factor in shaping executive pay since 
the 1980s. 
 
The ABI has been most active (however some commentators maintain that RREV/ISS now takes pole 
position, due to ISS’ US link),134 with publications in 2012135 and 2013.136   The FRC’s UKSC137  
and its publications on ‘comply or explain’138 provide much detail on UK practice and requirements  
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for institutional shareholders, as does the Government’s Response to the Kay Review.139   The ABI’s 
2013 publication states: ‘ the reciprocal of the accountability of the board to shareholders is the 
responsibility of shareholders to be proactive in the discharge of their stewardship 
responsibilities’.140  
 
The UKSC141 applies on a ‘comply or explain’ basis, setting out the principles of effective stewardship 
by investors. In practice though there are many difficulties/conflicts involved, as covered in Simon 
Wong’s 2010 paper142.  He states:  ‘[A]s the dominant owners of listed companies in many developed 
markets, institutional shareholders have been under increasing pressure to act as responsible 
shareholders’.143  He believes: ‘stewardship is not in their genetic makeup’.144   Wong notes: 
‘inappropriate performance metrics and financial arrangements that promote trading and short-
term returns’, ‘executive portfolio diversification that makes monitoring difficult’, a ‘lengthening 
share ownership chain that weakens an “owner mindset”’, ‘a misguided interpretation of fiduciary 
duty that accords excessive deference to quantifiable data at the expense of qualitative factors’ and 
a ‘flawed business model and governance approach of passive funds’.145    
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There are dangers in asset managers rewarding themselves for delivering short-term results and 
comparative, rather than absolute, performance generates rewards.   Another issue is where asset 
managers are rewarded for bringing in new funds: ‘rather than expanding existing assets through 
superior investment performance’.146   Wong considers: ‘the starting point is to lengthen the 
performance review time period and reduce emphasis on relative returns’.147   He cites a US value 
asset manager: ‘five-to-ten year basis, since a market cycle is at least that long’.148 
 
Joseph Bachelder refers to ‘quarterly capitalism’. He questions the effectiveness of the ‘oversight’ 
institutional shareholders can provide regarding executive pay in investee companies (as compared 
to the board of directors).   Bachelder notes: ‘[U]nfortunately, TSR has become a dominant measure 
in the thinking of institutional shareholders, and their proxy advisors, regarding executive pay.  To a 
significant extent, a stock market metric has been substituted for the numerous and often complex 
considerations (…) necessary to evaluate executive pay programmes at investee companies’. 149 
 
Tom Powdrill makes the point: ‘[R]egrettably, however, there are no signs that the UK ‘s institutional 
shareholders are likely to champion a shift away from performance-related reward any time soon.   
In general they remain implicitly wedded to a view of executive motivation where incentives can be 
designed to elicit the right behaviour’. 150 He refers to ‘the new big idea in the investment 
community is ‘career shares’ whereby executives are required to hold at least some share awards 
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until retirement (…) this seems to be a non-starter from a motivational point of view, since recipients 
will put very little value on rewards that lie a long way into the future.’151    
 
Although some of Powdrill’s criticisms can be attributed to his strongly-held view that a focus on the 
structure of executive pay ‘does not address the political problem of growing executive reward’,152 
his point is that institutional shareholders are part of part of the ‘executive pay problem’ – in that 
they look at the structure of pay, as opposed to whether in his words there are “problems with 
performance pay” ’.153 
 
The Kay Review sets out John Kay’s suggested ‘foundation for future developments in public and 
regulatory policy and market practice in the investment chain’.154  BIS’s Response refers to Kay’s 
recommendations on better alignment between pay and long-term performance for company 
directors and asset managers.155   BIS’s Recommendation 13 on ‘career shares’ accepts that Kay’s 
prescription is ‘sensible’ (i.e., that LTIs for EDs should only be provided in the form of ‘career 
shares’), but it does not favour ‘blanket regulation’.156 
 
BIS’s Response notes that ‘a number of institutional shareholders have set out clearly that they 
expect companies’ remuneration policies to be much simpler and include incentive plans which are 
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genuinely long-term in nature’157 – referring to Hermes’s 2012 discussion paper on proposed 
reforms to UK executive remuneration.   The government takes the same view regarding asset 
managers’ remuneration (Recommendation 16): ‘asset management firms should similarly structure 
managers’ remuneration so as to align the interests of asset managers with the interests and 
timescales of their clients’158.  They propose that pay should not be linked to short-term 
performance of the investment fund or asset management firm but rather a ‘long-term performance 
incentive should be provided in the form of an investment in the fund (either directly or via the firm) 
to be held at least until the manager is no longer responsible for that fund’.159 One can see here that 
Kay, Lord Myners (in his 2013 comments to the House of Commons BIS Committee160) and the 
government are making broadly similar points.   
 
Institutional shareholder remuneration guidelines for investee companies still feature comparative 
TSR performance (it could be argued that this metric, and the particular way it is generally employed 
in an LTI context, mean that it is best used only as an ‘underpin’ to absolute business performance 
measures) and seek to avoid ‘rewards for failure’, rather than incentivising strong and sustained 
absolute performance.   So in a way company management and institutional investors are in the 
same boat – the former are subject to mandatory IMS (quarterly reporting) and the latter to short-
term fund performance considerations.    It may be that the EU will, in due course, remove the 
quarterly reporting requirement from the Transparency Directive.    
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4.5.           Psychology of performance-related pay 
Powdrill considers ‘human motivation is more complicated than mainstream corporate governance, 
and its emphasis on incentive schemes assumes’.161   He asserts that ‘repeated attempts to redesign 
incentive schemes have diverted shareholder attention away from the overall scale of rewards.  
Indeed, until relatively recently some asset managers made it almost a point of principle that their 
interest in remuneration was limited to the way it was structured’ and that ‘directors and business 
lobbyists often seek to defend large overall packages on the basis that much of it is performance-
related’.162   Powdrill contrasts the ‘two major camps in the argument over the psychology of 
incentives are those informed by behaviourism and those who favour what has latterly become 
known as self-determination theory’.163    
 
Powdrill notes ‘[T]here is one interesting overlap between the two camps.   Both believe that 
rewards may be ineffective if they are seen as controlling.   This is significant, since in corporate 
governance debates incentive schemes are usually explicitly intended to control executive 
behaviour’.164   Powdrill’s conclusion is that: ‘it seems unlikely that performance-related reward will 
make much of a difference to those who are highly-motivated’, citing Kenneth Thomas ‘so if you are 
successful in building high intrinsic motivation, don’t expect your pay system to have a major 
positive effect on performance’.165 
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The self-determination literature argues that extrinsic motivation, such as the incentive structures, 
can ‘crowd out’ intrinsic motivation to do the job well.   This is picked up by Chuka Umunna, Labour’s 
Shadow Business Secretary:  (…) ’the heavy focus on the alignment of high powered incentives risks 
crowding out other more rounded but equally powerful intrinsic motivations of executives that are 
just as relevant to the company’s success’.166    
 
A detailed examination of ‘the underlying human frailties that are exacerbated by variable pay’ is 
Dimitros Contraros’s 2012 article.167 Regarding variable pay, he states: ‘the prevalence of this 
concept within banking has produced negative consequences.   Indeed, the motivation of high levels 
of remuneration is said to have driven executives to engage in excessive risk taking that has been 
held to be a contributory risk factor to the rise of the recession.’168   The scenario is one of executives 
focusing on short-term profits and simply ignoring long-term performance aspects.   Contraros’s 
view is that the regulatory response to this (i.e., SYSC 19A – promoting a long-term time horizon and 
appropriate attention to risk-taking) will not work because ‘the underlying factor of high levels of 
monetary incentives continue to be used’.169 
 
Contraros considered the rigid nature of SYSC 19A (including high levels of mandatory deferral in the 
payment of incentives and malus/clawback arrangements) could result in banks ‘expanding the fixed 
component of pay to make up for the loss in variable remuneration’.170   He notes that there is 
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already evidence this is happening, with strong basic salary increases.171  Contraros notes the longer-
term focus introduced in SYSC 19A, but argues that ‘the regulation addresses only half the 
problem’.172   His concern is that ‘the use of variable incentives and performance targets to attract 
and motivate executives will continue to narrow their focus and fail to acknowledge lateral 
considerations of ethics, honesty, integrity and risks’.173  
Certainly, Main’s RC interviewees were ‘quite simply sceptical of the efficiency of the process’ of 
choosing the pay elements and the strengths of their link to performance, with one stating:  ‘[T]his 
motivation business is “phooey”.   People do the best job they can’.174 Main refers to the tension 
‘that exists within the remuneration committee between “Performance” on the one hand (achieving 
an effective agency theory type pay mechanism, thereby strategically aligning incentives) and 
“Conformance” on the other’.175  The latter’s emphasis is on being able to demonstrate on an ex-
post basis that the payment outcomes conform to corporate governance guidelines/codes. 
 
4.6.        Findings:  Remuneration committee advisors/in-house executive compensation HR 
specialists 
Remuneration consultants tend to work for one of the major employee benefit consulting firms or, 
alternatively, a Big 4 accounting firm.  There is criticism of their activities. Umunna argues that: ‘the 
role of remuneration consultants must be looked at (…) there are widespread concerns that these 
consultancies are ratcheting up pay here too’.176   He identifies ‘[P]art of the problem is that – in 
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their advisory role to remuneration committees – the consultants owe their duty to the Board and 
not to shareholders.   This needs to be looked at, along with the risk of conflict where consultants 
are advising both executive management and non-executive directors on remuneration’.177 
 
Although Umunna does state: ‘I am aware of the voluntary guidelines to prevent remuneration 
consultants cross-selling services’,178 he considers binding rules should be put in place to prevent 
conflicts of interest.   He mentions lawyers by way of comparison.   Apart from the fact that many of 
the UK’s leading remuneration consultants are actually professionally qualified as lawyers, 
accountants or actuaries (and work for firms that have business codes in place, authorised/regulated 
by the FRC or similar), Umunna disregards the VC’s underlying principle that ‘the role of consultants 
is not to make decisions’.179    
 
If remuneration consultants had a duty to shareholders, this would mean that the RC could not look 
to their consultants as being ‘their advisors’.   Even if it were a ‘dual’ duty (i.e., to the RC and 
shareholders) this would entail the remuneration consultants having two ‘masters’.   The present 
arrangement is straightforward and the line of accountability to shareholders is explicit and easily 
understood. 
 
There is potential for conflicts of interest to arise in the situation where the appointed remuneration 
consultants work for a firm that provides other services to the company concerned, but the way this 
is best dealt with is via disclosure and various other safeguards.   An appointed remuneration 
committee advisor knows that he/she should not advise executive management without first 
obtaining permission from the RC Chair.     
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In recent years, FTSE 100 companies have moved towards having an in-house executive 
compensation specialist working in HR.   The Main/TW Study referred to earlier found that ‘[A] 
supportive and independently-minded HR function whose role vis-à-vis the RC is clear ‘is one of the 
key success factors in making a remuneration committee successful’.180   This seems entirely 
sensible. 
 
An in-house executive compensation specialist may potentially be over-influenced by executive 
management, and may therefore be tempted to ‘manipulate’ the independent remuneration 
consultant’s advice. The appointed remuneration consultant will have direct access to the RC Chair if 
any such concerns manifest themselves.   Generally, RC Chairs are keen to have excellent 
liaison/input between the in-house executive compensation specialist and the appointed 
remuneration consultants, as this minimises the danger of the latter’s advice being delivered in a 
vacuum/not taking on board legitimate interests of executive management. 
 
4.7.      Findings:   Benefits-v-obligations of UK regulatory regime 
The UK debate on executive pay tends to conflate regulation with allegedly high pay levels/’rewards 
for failure’.   This is understandable given the sort of ‘rewards for failure’ reflected in Barty’s case 
studies.181   As Barty states regarding the Shareholders’ Spring of 2012: ‘this suggests that 
shareholders have finally had enough of executives who persist in rewarding themselves for sub-
standard performance’.182   The HPC also majors on the ever-widening pay gap between company 
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boards and that of their workers (it is indicative that the title of the relevant article is:  ‘[E]xecutive 
pay increases despite attempt at regulation’). 183 
 
The objectives of regulation may include limits on executive pay levels, but few would argue that the 
purpose of regulation is simply to constrain/cap executive pay.   If this were the case, then UK 
executive pay regulation to date would have been a disaster. Pay levels have indeed soared; 
however, a more objective view is surely that the regulation of executive pay is about far more than 
simply attempting to restrain pay levels.   
 
Barty has the correct take on all this. The key concern is ‘rewards for failure’.   Accordingly, 
regulation should focus on structuring executive pay in ways that oblige executives to share the 
downside suffered by shareholders when a business is unsuccessful (and vice versa). Although 
Powdrill would doubtless argue ‘they are focusing on structure again’, that would be seen by many 
commentators as being something of a counsel of perfection. 
 
Greenbury’s emphasis was on RCs’ duties and accountabilities, together with enhanced disclosure of 
directors’ pay.  The pay aspect was limited to the exhortation that pay levels should be no higher 
than necessary.   True, stress was placed in both Greenbury and Hampel on pay-for-performance, 
but this – plus subsequent codes/regulation/guidelines - is a world away from ‘hard-wired’ caps on 
executive pay.   The focus instead is on transparency (so shareholders know how much directors are 
paid and the pay-performance linkage) and accountability. In this context, UK pay regulation over 
the past 35 years has been very beneficial. It justifies the obligations imposed, but detailed 
disclosure improvements are still required and the pay-performance linkage needs reform. 
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CHAPTER 5 
5.1.       Conclusions 
UK executive pay regulation over the past 35 years has resulted in a far more transparent and 
accountable regime. On pay-performance linkage in particular though, much remains to be done 
regarding ‘rewards for failure’, the need for a longer-term time horizon and LTI design generally. 
Commentators may dispute whether regulation alone can remedy the perceived problems. For 
example, those who consider that executive pay is simply far too high argue that regulation could 
resolve this (even politicians who are not particularly ‘left leaning’ take this view sometimes; e.g., 
the House of Commons Treasury Committee’s comment ‘it should be the FSA’s function to regulate 
levels of the amounts of pay in the banking sector’).184  
 
Those whose principal concern is ‘rewards for failure’, such as Barty, promote the use of deferral and 
‘clawback’ arrangements – proposing that ‘50% of all variable compensation is deferred for a 
minimum of five years, with no vesting to be faster than straight line.   As a result 150% of average 
variable compensation would be available for ‘clawback’ in the case of underperformance’.185 This 
approach has more in common with Powdrill’s than some might appreciate.   Powdrill mentions the 
PwC/LSE research project into the psychology of incentives: ‘most executives surveyed said they 
were driven by more than money, and many also reported that incentive schemes did not motivate 
them’. 186    PwC concludes: ‘[E]xecutives are risk-averse, don’t like complexity and discount deferred 
pay (…) we have had to pay executives more to compensate.  If pay better reflected executive 
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psychology, maybe it could be lower’.187 Although Powdrill considers that ‘institutions are unlikely to 
champion a shift away from performance-reward any time soon’ – and is likely to be correct in this 
regard – the TW/Main 2013 Study of institutional shareholders’ views does reveal some common 
ground.188   On pay-performance linkage institutional shareholders accepted that higher leverage 
can increase the likelihood of unintended consequences in the working of incentives.  
 
This is relevant to the ‘lottery issue’ of EDs seeking high LTI opportunity because until fairly recently 
the institutional shareholder guidelines used effectively to stipulate (due to the ‘no vesting below 
median comparative TSR performance provisions) that there was a 50:50 chance that none of an LTI 
award will vest.  On top of this, the chances of vesting were very timing/data dependent .   
 
The TW/Main Study also showed that institutional shareholders are keen ‘to emphasise executive 
shareholdings over the long-term ‘(…) including shareholding requirements, deferrals and longer 
vesting/holding periods for long-term incentives’.189   What is stressed is not just incentive metrics 
but also the alignment of remuneration with strategy in terms of time horizon.  Key additional points 
raised by institutional shareholders were simplifying LTIs and reducing pay leverage (with 
consequentially lower award values). 
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Interestingly, only one of the institutional investors consulted their bondholder/fixed income 
colleagues.   Bondholders tend to remain silent on executive pay issues (this would probably not 
remain the case if companies were to adopt Alex Edmans’s proposal that CEOs should be paid via a 
combination of debt and equity). 190 The overall conclusion of the TW/Main Study is that ‘[F]und 
managers in general view pay increases subordinate to questions about the overall business strategy 
of investee companies’.191 Kevin Keasey argues companies’ executive pay arrangements have 
allowed institutional shareholders to keep their distance and minimise monitoring efforts and active 
engagement’.192    
Institutional shareholders and RCs have difficult roles to fulfil and the demands upon them grow 
apace.   There are limits too on how closely institutional shareholders can become engaged with 
their investee companies.   Main’s research shows what a difficult task RCs face in terms of 
professionalism, time commitment and review of payment outcomes. The solution to the UK’s 
executive pay debate does not lie primarily in more regulation. This is underlined by Contraros when 
he states there is a ‘need to prevent the negative elements of performance-based remuneration that 
were just as, if not more, responsible for the financial crisis as the weaknesses in remuneration 
structures themselves’.193   This is also echoed by Stephen Haddrill’s comment: ‘[R]emuneration of 
executives on the Board must also incentivise them to put the company’s well-being before their 
own’.194   Contraros’s reference to ‘ethics, honesty, integrity and risks’ is important in this context.   
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In relation to financial services, John Plender states: ‘the financial system appears to have become 
an ethics-free zone’ and ‘at a personal level bonuses took precedence over virtually everything, 
including the customer (…)[A]s long as incentives are at odds with ethical requirements, common 
decency will be a minority pursuit. Scandals are inevitable’.195   Plender states: ‘boards have simply 
failed to recognise that pay and incentives were encouraging behaviour that was at odds with the 
claimed values of the organisation’. He argues that there needs to be ‘a retreat from the obsession 
with punishing corporations rather than senior executives’.   His concern is that: ‘[M]odestly refining  
the carrots and using the wrong sticks is a poor formula for rebuilding the moral capital stock.  There 
has to be a more radical way’.    
 
Anthony Hilton refers to Andrew Smithers’s words:  ‘[M]odern incentives have increased the 
difference between the short-term interests of management and the long-term interests of 
shareholders (…)[M]odern incentives are thus contrary to the interests of long-term shareholders’.196  
Smithers’s view is that managers are obsessed with their STIs.   Hilton states: ‘the whole idea of 
engaging with underperforming companies is a mistaken attack on the symptoms of corporate 
decline, and this prevents there being a proper focus on the root cause of decline, which is to be 
found in the way top executives are paid’. 
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5.2.          Recommendations 
Social cohesion is threatened by rancorous criticisms of executive pay – with diversion away from 
the real goal of how best to achieve sustainable economic growth and enhanced prosperity of the 
population generally, to a Them-v-Us conflict.   Further work will be required to formulate robust 
improvements that secure the buy-in of key parties - but some initial recommendations are set out 
below. 
 
Recommendation 1: Regulation.   
The regulatory provisions which came into force this year should be given time to bed-down.   Any 
review will probably take place anyway, on the first to occur of a change of government, another 
economic downturn or a series of corporate scandals.   In due course, review consideration should 
be given to implementing Knight’s disclosure proposals (particularly on ‘realisable value’), plus 
Barty’s (on deferral of variable pay) and also addressing the disclosure valuation issues discussed 
already in relation to LTIs and pensions.   Further global initiatives on regulation and corporate 
governance codes/remuneration guidelines would also be welcome, but are not covered in this 
paper. 
 
Recommendation 2: Institutional shareholders. 
Kay’s Investor Forum should devote efforts to institutional investors’ ‘short-termism’ and their 
flawed remuneration incentives.  Once institutional shareholders have taken on their own 
challenges, they should be better placed to introduce remuneration guidelines that promote a long-
term mind set and rewards for EDs.   It is encouraging that since Main’s 2007 findings there is now 
less reliance in UK LTIs on comparative TSR, in favour of using that metric in combination with an 
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absolute business performance measure(s).   Institutional shareholders should also address the 
situation where a RC can be caught between the Scylla of one set of guidelines and the Charybdis of 
another (e.g., in respect of a particular LTI design feature). 
 
Recommendation 3: Remuneration committees. 
Main’s research puts paid to any suggestion that, due to the improvements in RC 
governance/practice post-Cadbury, nothing further needs to be done.  RCs undoubtedly important 
role as directors generally (e.g., on company strategy) needs to be supplemented by greater 
‘professionalism’ in terms of the RC being thoroughly committed, as Main recommends, to 
‘calibrating the LTI with critical success factors of the company’s business strategy’ and to ‘examining 
the entire portfolio of unvested and vested – but unexercised - executive reward while considering 
the composition of the latest year’s reward’.  197 
 
Implementing Main’s key recommendations will inevitably require additional RC training (perhaps 
even introduction of a formal ‘ticket’ for RC Chairs, at least) and time devoted to reading 
papers/meetings/communicating with EDs and institutional shareholders.   There needs to be 
greater recognition and appreciation of the value of RC Chairs (who should be highly experienced in 
both remuneration and business matters).   NEDs should be well remunerated for devoting the time 
needed to fulfil their duties. As Aine Hurley states: ‘[M]atching the structure and quantum of 
remuneration to the  precise needs of the particular company is one of the most important, if not 
the most important, roles in the success and/or survival of the business’.198 
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Recommendation 4: Remuneration committee advisors/in-house executive compensation HR 
specialists.  
UK remuneration consultants agree to be bound by the VC, are subject to their respective employing 
firms’ business conduct protocols, and in many cases are additionally bound by codes put in place by 
their own professional bodies.  Therefore, the burden of proving any necessity for additional 
regulatory controls on remuneration consultants should be on those who make them.     
 
In-house executive compensation HR specialists are, ironically, not only subject to more risk of being 
‘leant on’ by corporate management but are also not bound by the VC (as they do not act as 
appointed independent advisors to the RC).   One way to promote higher professional standards in 
respect of both remuneration committee advisors and in-house executive compensation specialists 
would be to establish a professional qualification (on a licence-to-practise basis) for at least the 
former (many of the latter are recruited from the ranks of the former anyway). 
 
Recommendation 5: Remuneration packages. 
The structure of UK incentive packages needs reform.    EDs regard LTIs as a complete ‘lottery’ and 
massively discount the value of LTIs at the time of award.    EDs’ argument runs that to secure any 
vesting value they need to remain in service for at least three years in normal circumstances (the 
Fidelity initiative for a ‘five-year hold’ is currently trending the period up to five years), plus often a 
comparative TSR hurdle needs to be attained (with a straight line vesting schedule to upper quartile 
comparative performance attainment) – so their own company’s own performance may well not be 
the only or key determinant of vesting.   LTI opportunity has increased because EDs may seek to 
‘max out’ in the performance cycles, perhaps one cycle in three, where there may be solid 
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‘bounceback’ between previous poor performance and current solid performance.    This increases 
the chances of ‘rewards for failure’ occurring. 
 
EDs also focus on STI opportunity – where a single year performance time horizon gives better ‘line 
of sight’.   RCs have collaborated in this process because they feel, as Main found in his research, far 
more comfortable in setting absolute business performance metrics and ‘calibration’ to annual 
business budgets/strategy.199  This unvirtuous circle is completed by institutional shareholders who, 
despite articulating a long-term interest, are driven by their own short-term demons (in terms of 
retaining mandates/confidence of their own investors). 
 
EDs, RCs and institutional shareholders are all thinking too short-term.   A starting point would be to 
accept that the UK’s incentive pay regime is somewhat broken – and fixing it will require co-
operation between the parties concerned.   Barty is correct in arguing that compensation needs to 
be tied to the long-term  performance of companies: ‘recently more compensation is being paid out 
in shares, but the average period over which incentive programmes are assessed is three years, 
which we believe is too short a time to truly reflect the long-term performance of a company.’ 200  He 
states: ‘[T]he extension of long-term incentive plans to five years would result in some pay would be 
exposed to the performance of the company over ten years thereby truly linking pay to the long-
term success of the company’.201  Barty additionally proposes that 50% of all variable pay (STI and 
LTI) should be deferred for a minimum of five years. The combination of a five-year performance 
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period, with the deferred portion paid out on a straight line over the next five years, is a sound 
concept – but needs other LTI design changes as well if it is to work effectively.  
 
Extending the performance period to five years, and ‘leaking out’ deferred payouts over the 
following five, is an excellent counter to ‘rewards for failure’ (with strong ‘clawback’ provisions), and 
would only reward genuinely long-term success’.  However, it does not avoid the issues raised in 
EDs’ perception that current UK LTI performance conditions stipulated by institutional shareholders 
are too comparative and insufficiently geared off absolute company performance.  The solution is to 
build on Barty’s  proposals by adding in elements of the PwC/LSE Study referred to by Powdrill.202 
This provides a future paradigm for UK incentives that  is a more practical, real-world solution than 
adopting Powdrill’s ‘purist’ approach.   
 
Barty is not so much concerned about executive pay levels as such, he is worried about ‘rewards for 
future’ – whereas Powdrill is very much of the view that executive pay is too high and incentives are 
part of the problem.  In this light, Powdrill’s criticism of ‘career shares’ is understandable – and is 
supported in certain respects by the government’s refusal to give explicit legislative support to Kay’s 
proposals in this regard203 (Lord Myners also sees the practical difficulties in the ‘career share’ 
concept204) – but TW/Main’s Study shows that ‘career shares’  have considerable performance 
characteristics, including limiting ‘rewards for failure’.205  Barty’s proposals capture the best points of 
‘career shares’ without actually going down that route.   This is a pragmatic approach – focusing on 
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the long-term nature of five-year rolling performance periods, whilst avoiding institutional 
shareholder concerns over the whole concept of ‘career shares’.  
 
The key point is that the UK’s current executive incentives regime needs to change to being longer-
term in focus, whilst mitigating the downsides in LTI participant perception otherwise inherent in 
this.   EDs’ natural concern regarding long LTI performance periods is understandable, but can be 
reduced by using metrics they feel they can influence and which reward them commensurately. 
 
Recommendation 6: Corporate ethics/behaviour.  
Regulation has its limits. Commentators may argue about where these lie, but the need for sound 
business ethics and behaviour runs through the whole UK executive pay debate.   Responsible 
capitalism – on which the UK’s prosperity depends – demands that all parties, whether board 
directors generally, RC members (and their external/internal advisors), institutional shareholders 
and other stakeholders, must pay due regard to the ethical considerations referred to by Contraros 
and Plender.   The difficulties involved in promoting and securing adherence to such behaviour are 
admittedly large – particularly in a world where competing territories may seek to secure business 
advantage/regulatory arbitrage - but this makes it all the more essential to rise to the challenge.
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